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competent, independent advice to a donor. The court has only required
that the donee sustain the burden of proving that there was no undue
influence where the parties were in a confidential relation and the donee
in a position of dominance. In Davis v. Dean the donor, an aged lady,
made gifts of real estate constituting the substantial, portion of her
estate to her grand-daughter and the grand-daughter's husband several
days before death. This gift cut off a daughter and several grand-
children. The husband, while in a position of trust and confidence with
the donor, showed an effort to keep those most interested in ignorance of
the pending gift. The gifts were set aside. Under these circumstances the
Court said that the defendant had the burden of proving that there was
no undue influence. It suggested that he should have given some of
the parties adversely interested an opportunity to be present when
the deeds were executed, or to be represented there by some chosen
friend or counsel, so that they would be cognizant of the whole trans-
action. Such evidence would aid in showing that the donee acted hon-
estly and fairly in the matter.10 Thus the donee in Wisconsin need not
affirmatively prove that the donor had the benefit of competent, inde-
pendent advice. The presence or absence of such advice will be con-
sidered as evidence on the general question of undue influence.
An interesting point was raised in Beilfuss v. Dinnauer."I In this
case the defendant, in trying to prove that there was no undue influence,
introduced testimony that the donor had conferred with a lawyer as
to procedure in making a gift of land to the defendant. This evidence
was admitted by the trial court, but rejected by the Supreme Court upon
appeal, on the ground that it was a privileged communication between
attorney and client. This creates a dilemma in a state following the
New Jersey rule as to competent, independent advice-which rule al-
most demands that a lawyer give the advice. 2
JAMES W. ANGERMEIER
Restitution- Recovery of Part Payments by a Defaulting Plaintiff -
Defendant brewing company contracted to sell beer to plaintiff and
his partner as wholsale buyers over a period beginning in 1946 and
ending in 1951. Upon execution of the contract, plaintiff and his part-
ner paid $20,000.00 "to secure performance of the contract," which
was to be applied to the last shipments of beer under the contract, but
if the contract was breached by the buyer, the deposit was to be used
to the extent of defendant's actual damages. Plaintiff warranted he
was a licensed dealer, but he in fact was not and was denied the neces-
20 Davis v. Dean, 66 W. 100, 26 N.W. 737 (1886).
11174 W. 507, 183 N.W. 700 (1921).
12 Wis. Stat. (1949) Sec. 325.22.
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sary license to sell beer. With the consent and approval of plaintiff,
defendant refunded $10,000.00 to plaintiff's partner. In 1948, plaintiff
brought action to recover the $10,000.00 remaining in defendants' hands
alleging a mutual abandonment of the contract due to the refund to
his partner, and alleging plaintiff's ownership of the money. Defendant
answered that plaintiff had breached the contract thereby forfeiting
any money on deposit. Held: While the general rule in Oldahoma is
that a plaintiff who has advanced money, or done an act in performance
of the contract, and then breaches the contract, cannot recover back
what has been advanced or done, here the contract provided for its
own measure of relief, the retention of the deposit only to the extent
of actual damages. The facts as pleaded cannot be construed as an
abandonment of the contract by defendant. Acme Distributing Co. et
al. v. Rorie, 183 Fed. (2d) 694 (C.C.A. 10th, 1950).
The rights of a defaulting plaintiff who has partly performed de-
pend on the nature of his promise. Most business agreements call for
the payment of money by one party or the other. This note is limited
to those contracts in which the performance of the defaulting plaintiff
is to pay money.1
The plaintiff cannot sue on the contract, his action must be in quasi-
contract. Keener2 says this:
"Quasi---contractual in its nature necessarily is the obligation of
defendant who, though he has entered into a contract with the
plaintiff, and has a perfect defence to any action brought by
1 It may be appropriate here to refer briefly to those agreements where the de-
fendant is to pay money. In the cases where plaintiff is to build or construct
upon real estate, unless there is an express condition, plaintiff can recover the
contract price if he has substantially performed, less damages to defendant.
(Dyer v. Lintz, 76 N.J.L. 204, 68 A. 908 (1908) ; Contra: Bowen V. Kimbell,
203 Mass. 364, 89 N.E. 542 (1909) which rejects the doctrine of substantial
performance.) The theory is that a partial breach is not a failure of condition.
Where plaintiff has rendered less than substantial performance, he may re-
cover in quantum meruit for benefit conferred at the contract rate if he was
in good faith, either regardless of the existence of actual acceptance (Pinches
v. Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Church, 55 conn. 193, 10 A. 264 (1887), or
only if there has been actual acceptance (Nees et al. v. Weaver, 222 Wis. 492,
296 N.W. 266 (1936). Where an employee plaintiff breaches his contract of
employment, recovery in quantum meruit is usually denied (Williston on Con-
tracts (Rev. Ed.) Vol. V, sec. 1477 (1937), but recovery has been allowed
(Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834) and under some theories, only where
the breach is not wilfull and deliberate (Rest. of Contracts, sec. 357 (1933) ;
Walsh v. Fisher, 102 Wis. 122, 78 N.W. 437 (1899). Where the seller under a
contract for the sale of goods defaults after part delivery and the buyer ac-
cepts or retains the goods knowing the seller is not going to perform in full,
he must pay at the contract rate, but where he has used or disposed of the
goods before he knows the seller is not going to perform in full, the buyer
must pay only the fair value to him of the goods so received (Wis. Stats.
121.44 (1949), but the seller is still liable for damages to the buyer (Wis.
Stats. 121.49 (1949).




the plaintiff on the contract, is yet held liable in assumpsit to
the plaintiff for value received under the contract."
Plaintiff's right to recover ". . . rests upon the doctrine that a man
shall not be allowed to enrich himself unlawfully at the expense of
another."3 The actual intention of the parties, especially that of the de-
fendant, is entirely disregarded,4 proof of the contract is merely to
show that plaintiff is not an intermeddler5 The application of this doc-
trine to a defaulting plaintiff, however, is in conflict with another
fundamental principle in our law, that a man should not lightly break
his promise and should not have any standing in court as against the
innocent party who has bargained for full performance.6 Text writers
seem to favor the former doctrine. Corbin7 maintains that restitution
should be denied only in the following cases: 1) where defendant has
not rescinded and remains ready and willing to perform and has a
right to specific performance against plaintiff; 2) where plaintiff has
not shown that defendant's damages are less than installments paid;
3) where an express provision permits defendant to keep the money
and it is not a penalty. Apparently Woodwards would have the right to
recover rest on the good faith of plaintiff, but most of the cases rightly
ignore this circumstance.9
At this point this question suggests itself: what happens when a
party breaches his promise? In most bilateral contracts, one promise
is given in exchange for the other, but the order of performance of the
promises is determined by the contract, business custom, and the law,
thereby making one promise conditional and one unconditional. Per-
formance by the party to go first is a condition precedent to the exis-
tence of the duty of the second party to perform. If the first party does
not perform, the duty of the second party never arises, the failure of
condition discharges the second party's promise, and he has a cause
of action for breach. Along the same line, if either party repudiates
his promise before performance date, the other party is discharged.
The cases finding a mutual rescission seem to ignore these princi-
ples. Rescission is available against a defaulting defendant and involves
a return to the statas quo for both parties.'0 Its usual purpose is to
furnish an alternative remedy for restitution against a defendant who
has breached or repudiated, in favor of a plaintiff who has partially
3 Ibid.4 Kellum v. Browning's Adm'r., 231 Ky. 308, 21 S.W. (2d) 459 (1929).
5 Rest. of Restitution, secs. 2, 107 (1937).
6 Williston on Contracts (Rev. Ed.) Vol. V, sec. 1473 (1937).
7 Corbin, "The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments
Paid," 40 Yale L. J. 1013 (1931).
8 Woodward, Frederick C., The Law of Quasi Contracts, sec. 177 (1913).9 Supra, note 8.
10 Ballou v. Billings, 136 Mass. 307 (1884).
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performed.1' A defaulting plaintiff can only offer to rescind and such
offer must be accepted in much the same manner as is necessary in the
formation of a contract, and to say that an attempt to mitigate damages
is an acceptance is a mere fiction.12 Defendant's duty to perform never
came into existence, his promise is discharged.
The majority rulei3 recognizes the business principles involved.
When the seller commits himself, he wants assurance that the buyer
will perform, and to permit recovery of the part payment defeats the
purpose of the contract. The majority rule denies recovery regardless
of the extent of damages as compared to the amount of the payment.
The basis is that defendant has not been enriched unjustly. There need
not be an express provision to that effect.
Where there is no express provision for retention of the payment,
recovery has been allowed on the ground that retention would impose
punitive damages,1 4 or simply that retention would be unjust. 5 Where
there is such express provision, it has been avoided as a penalty.Y In
both cases, the advance payment has usually been greatly in excess of
actual damages.
Most of the present day cases arise under an express provision.
Whether or not it is a penalty or liquidated damages may turn on the
amount in excess of damage,'7 or the language of the provision.'8 The
Wisconsin court has recognized the differeice between a penalty and a
provision providing for retention of part payments. In Seeman v. Bie-
mann,'9 where the contract provided for the payment of liquidated
1 Williston on Contracts (Rev. Ed.) VoL V, sec. 1455 (1933).
2 Malmberg V. Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 218 P. 975 (1923).
s3 Kaufmann v. Baldridge, 162 F. (2d) 793 (C.C.A. 10th, 1947); Ketchum &
Sweet v. Evertson, 13 Johns 359 (N.Y., 1916). The Rest. of Contracts, sec.
1, 357 (1933) says that plaintiff can recover if his breach was not wilful and
deliberate, and in sec. 2, that he cannot recover if it was payment of earnest
money or the contract provides for retention and is not so in excess of
defendant's harm as to be a penalty. Sec. 2 is apparently in accord with the
majority rule in view of the fact that earnest money is now universally re-
garded as equivalent to part payment (Charles R. Ablett Co. v. Sencer, 130
Misc. 416, 224 N.Y.S. 251 (1921) ; Weidner v. Hyland, 216 Wis. 12, 225 N.W.134 (1934).
USupra, note 14. Punitive damages are intended to mend an aggravated wrong,
or punish the defendant for evil behavior.
15 Michigan Yacht & Power Co. v. Busch, 143 F. 929 (C.C.A. 6th, 1906).
'16Biddle v. Biddle, 202 Mich. 160, 168 N.W. 92 (1918). A penalty, properly
spealdng, is an agreement founded in contract
T7 Rest of Contracts, sec. 339 (1933) holds that it is a penalty unless it is a
reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm caused, and the -harm
is incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation. Sec. 340 holds that money
deposits are judged by the same standard, except (comment a) where they
are a part of the agreed exchange for the consideration given by the promisee,
they are neither liquidated damages nor -penalties.18 17 C.J. 948, sec. 242 (1919), a deposit or part payment under a provision pro-
viding for retention in case of default is regarded as liquidated damages, but
it has been held to be a penalty when the contract says it is to secure per-
formance. See the language of the principal case.
1951]
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damages of $10.00 per day for delay in the completion of a building,
the court said that if the purpose of the provision is merely to secure
performance, and damages can be readily computed and the amount
in excess of the damage is unreasonable, it is a penalty regardless of
the language used. But a penalty is defined as a promise to pay a larger
sum on default of a promise to pay a lesser sum, or, where the sum to
be paid on default is greater than the defaulted sum or the entire debt.2"
Thus the result in Schneider v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Com-
pany21 where the contract called for part payment and retention in case
of default. After plaintiff paid $24,400.00 on the contract price of
$89,600.00, he defaulted. Notwithstanding that defendant had no ac-
tual damages, plaintiff could not recover. The court said:
"We see no theory, however, upon which a written contract
... can be set so aside and disregarded on behalf of one admit-
tedly in default thereunder and such defaulting party neverthe-
less be permitted to assert an independent right to all or part
of that which was paid under and pursuant to the terms of such
contract, and especially so when such payment, as it was here
distinctly and expressly agreed to by the parties, should be for-
feited as liquidated damages in case of just such a default as
it is here conceded existed."
It is the opinion of the writer that the court in that case stated the
logical and reasonable rule that should be applied in these cases.
KENNETia H. HAYES
Sales-Implied Warranties in the Sale of Secondhand Goods - Plain-
tiff, a Deleware Corporation, entered into a contract to sell a cheese
manufacturing plant including all equipment to the defendant, a Wis-
consin cooperative. A used boiler was included as part of the equip-
ment but conveyed on a separate bill of sale. In an action to recover
the balance of the purchase price the defendant claimed a set-off for
expenses incurred in repairing the boiler. Defendant alleged that the
plaintiff's agent orally warranted the fitness of the boiler for the pur-
poses to which the plaintiff knew it would be put. Prevented from
showing any express warranty by the parol evidence rule, defendant
sought to establish implied warranties on the basis that plaintiff knew
the intended use of the boiler and the defendant relied on the plaintiff's
skill and judgment as to its suitability for such use. Held: Secondhand
goods are not excluded as a matter of law from the operation of" the
Uniform Sales Act. § 15 (1).' Standard Brands v. Consolidated
Badger, 89 F.Supp. 5 (D.C., E.D., Wis. 1950).
19 108 Wis. 365, 84 N.W. 490 (1900).2 0Minn Billiard Company v. Schwab, 179 Wis. 129, 190 N.W. 836 (1922).
- 196 Wis. 56, 219 N.W. 370 (1928).
'Wis. Stats., 121.15 (1949), "Subject to the provisions of this act and of any
statute in that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the
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